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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02609-87/1
23 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Frederick L. Wettersing
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 16 June 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

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for Frederick L. Wettersing

Attachment:
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NIC #02609-87
16 June 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at the monthly warning meeting on 16 June.


2. Brief Items:

(1) Angola - Government/Rebel Offensives and South African Intervention.
DIA led the discussion and summarized government preparations for a major offensive into the UNITA-held southeast. There was consensus that:

- The lack of several key indicators suggests that the offensive is not yet imminent.

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- Judging by the scale of the government buildup to date, the upcoming offensive will be delayed further while more forces deploy or it will be no greater than Luanda's last major effort in 1985. After subtracting those forces that must remain in place to defend bases and lines of communication, analysts calculate that the Angolan government has 3 or 4 brigades available to attack UNITA's stronghold southward from Lucusse while another 3 infantry brigades can attack southeastward from Cuito Cuanavale. UNITA appears to have somewhat more forces available to defend against the coming offensive than it had in 1985. Some Angolan units in the north are having a problem with cholera, but we cannot yet detect any impact upon plans and operations in the south.



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- The NIO said that he anticipates a major South African incursion into southern Angola this summer. Pretoria might attack Cuito Cuanavale or Angolan radar sites in the southwest. The majority continues to view a South African intervention subject to a situational trigger--mainly a big SWAPO buildup or an MPLA offensive on Mavinga which UNITA cannot contain. All agreed that the South Africans are likely to take out any radar established at Cahama, as they did when such construction was attempted before.

Warning Note: The Angolan government has sufficient forces and supplies available for a medium-sized offensive at this time, but indicators of an imminent attack are lacking. The still incomplete Angolan radar site at Cahama will be provocative to South Africa, which has reacted militarily to similar provocations in the past.

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(2) Sudan - Insurgent Threat to the New Government. DIA led the discussion and highlighted the Sudanese military's heightened dissatisfaction in the aftermath of the recent insurgent success in capturing the defended border town of Jokau. There was consensus that:

- The potential for a military coup is increasing, although senior officers remain reluctant to take over the government and with it responsibility for Sudan's intractable problems. The military is pressing Prime Minister Sadiq to provide more resources to prosecute the war in the south, to negotiate peace, and to address the country's economic distress. Sadiq probably will not risk disciplining the military, but we do not know if he ordered the recent shuffle of three senior generals. Any new attempts by Sadiq to install loyalists in top military positions will increase chances for a coup.
- Jokau was a major loss and a stimulant to the military's dissatisfaction with Sadiq. If Nasir and other posts near the eastern border fall, it will open the way for more SPLA operations and logistical support from Ethiopia, thus heightening military unrest in Sudan.

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- Ethiopian air and artillery support for the SPLA probably has not increased significantly recently--we are skeptical about reports that an Ethiopian battalion mounted an attack in Sudan near Kassala--and Addis Ababa is unlikely to intervene deeply beyond the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. Khartoum is taking Ethiopian border violations seriously, however, and has recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa. Libyan activities in western Sudan are diminished but unclear.

Warning Note: Nasir and other Sudanese posts near the Ethiopian border probably will fall during the current rainy season. Such losses will increase the military's dissatisfaction with Sadiq, but the reluctant generals probably will not mount a coup without additional provocations. Coup planning, nonetheless, is on the increase.

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(3) Chad - Prospects for the War and Government Unity. DIA began the discussion of prospects for attacks on the remaining Libyan forces in northern Chad, which produced consensus that:

- President Habre's forces could attack Libyan outposts or Aozou town without further warning. They haven't attacked already because they were busy digesting and celebrating their recent major victories. Analysts believe that Habre has about 6,000 troops in the Tibesti mountains just south of the Libyans, although the French estimate only 4,000 are there.
- If the Chadians attack the main Libyan position at Aozou airfield, however, it probably won't be before August when President Habre will have returned from his travels abroad. The Libyans have been reinforcing the airfield--additional armored vehicles and troops have arrived there--but they probably cannot defeat a determined Chadian assault. Meanwhile, the French incorrectly insist that the airfield is north of the Chadian border in Libyan territory; they will not support a Chadian attack, although they cannot prevent it.
- Beyond the near term, Habre faces significant threats from Libyan-sponsored terrorist or insurgent attacks as well as tensions within his fragile multiethnic coalition. The few remaining Libyans in western Sudan near the Chadian border do not pose a conventional military threat, but analysts have noted some indications that Libya may intend to mount insurgent operations from there into Chad in the future. The recent clash between ethnic groups in Ndjamena has ended, but more such flare-ups are possible at any time.

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(4) Niger - President Kountche's Health. CIA led the discussion of this item, which was belatedly added to the agenda. The consensus was that:

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- Kountche probably will hold power until he dies--a successful coup against him is unlikely--and there is no designated successor. If he dies, the Supreme Military Council might rule Niger collegially for a period before picking a successor. Leading candidates to be chosen by the Council (or to attempt to seize power from the Council) include Prefect of Zinder Adamou Djermakoye, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Colonel Ali Saibou, and Prefect of Tahoua Tandja Mamadou. Analysts believe that a junior officer coup is unlikely.

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(5) Madagascar - New Unrest. CIA led the discussion and reported that the latest unrest has subsided. There was consensus that:

- The latest incidents grew out of traditional tribal rivalries in the southeast, although they were fanned by economic grievances and acquired a political dimension when the ruling and opposition parties took sides in supporting the tribes. President Ratsiraka sent troops to the area after local police and army troops could not handle the situation. Students also got into the act, although most of them have now gone back to classes. Despite reported plans by the Vonjy and Monima-K opposition parties, neither appears to have been active recently.
- The potential exists for resumed ethnic violence in the southeast, and student unrest in the cities, all of which can be exploited by the opposition parties. For the moment, however, the situation is calm.

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4. Main Item: Prospects for the Frontline States. To support an ongoing review of US policy toward southern Africa, the NIO led a discussion reviewing Community judgments on the Frontline States. Except as noted below, there was consensus that:

- The recent Estimates on Zimbabwe and Mozambique remain valid. INR questioned the Community's judgment, however, that the Mozambican government's ideology and military dependence upon Moscow hinder Western efforts to wean Maputo away from the Soviet orbit. The NIO explained that the recent Estimate highlighted the subtle and long-term nature of such constraints, and that it was the Community's judgment that the Mozambican government would not make a definitive break with Moscow. Thus, Maputo is unlikely to abrogate its treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow, deny the Soviets military access and evict the Soviet military advisory group, or repeal FRELIMO's self-proclaimed status as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party.
- Discussion of Malawi included some criticism of a recent CIA paper that predicted little policy change once aging President Banda eventually dies. Analysts arguing that dramatic change after Banda is unlikely suggested that some policy shifts already have begun under Banda. As examples, they cited Malawi's recently closer cooperation with the Frontline States and its dispatch of troops to Mozambique--both being in part responses to Malawi's worsening economic situation. The consensus was that there is some change in the air--Malawi cannot be ignored in the future--but a "sea change" in its policies and situation is unlikely. The NIO disagreed, envisioning more drastic change with a successor regime much closer to the Frontline States.
- Zambia is seen as increasingly vulnerable. President Kaunda is still capable of making decisions to reduce the impact of growing problems--including economic distress and deepening involvement in potentially destabilizing regional disputes including the South African/ANC conflict--and foreign donor assistance is continuing.
- The NIO cited a US policymaker's recent judgment that diminishing US aid levels to southern Africa and worsening economic conditions there will create new opportunities for Soviet meddling, and analysts agreed.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8D
DIA/JSI-5B
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Marine Corps
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/OIR
DDI/LDA
DDI/NESA
NPIC

ICS/OHC

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